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ABSTRACT 
 
Researchers in the field of accounting and finance often use event studies to measure the impact of 
various business decisions on the market value of stock.  They argue that market reaction to the 
event is predictive of the future effect on the company.  Sometimes researchers would like to follow 
up on these initial event studies to see if the market was correct in its predictions.  However, many 
times the original sample used for the event study does not survive intact into future time periods, 
which then raises the issue of survivor bias.  This paper examines one such event study in which 
the markets react favorably to announcements that ERP systems are being implemented.  
However, only 55% of the firms in the original sample survive through 2009, making any follow-
up study subject to the survivor bias argument.  The study examines the circumstances related to 
the non-survivors and, using proxies for the missing data, concludes that the results of a follow-up 
study would not have been impacted by survivor bias. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
esearchers in many academic fields face the issue of survivor bias when examining various phenomena 
occurring over time.  In medical research, the term takes on a literal meaning with patient survival the 
obvious desired outcome.  In other fields, such as accounting and finance, survivor bias generally 
refers to the exclusion of companies from performance studies because they no longer exist.  Although many of 
these studies assume that companies are missing because they have failed, non-survival may not necessarily be an 
indication of failure.  It is possible, for instance, that in examining the financial results for a sample of firms over an 
extended period of time, firms that drop out from the sample may do so, not because they have failed, but because 
they have been extremely successful and were acquired by a larger firm for a premium price.  
 
This paper is motivated, in part, by an event study (Hayes, Hunton and Reck, 2001) that measures the stock 
market reaction to announcements made by firms implementing ERP systems.  They find an overall favorable 
reaction to the announcements, indicating that capital markets expect the ERP investment to have a positive impact 
on future value.  Subsequent studies have used this same sample, some supplemented with additional 
announcements, to examine other issues related to ERP systems, including firm performance (Hunton, Lippincott 
and Reck, 2003), earnings management (Morris and Laksmana, 2010), internal control (Morris, 2011), and 
shareholder value (Morris, 2011).  In most of these subsequent studies, a number of firms included in the initial 
Hayes et al. (2001) study have been excluded because they are no longer publically traded, which raises a question 
as to whether the results are being influenced by survivor bias. 
 
This study examines reasons for non-survival and uses those reasons to develop proxies for missing data 
which are used to estimate abnormal returns for these non-survivors.  It then uses these abnormal returns and those 
of the survivors to measure the effect of survivor bias in testing whether the original event study accurately 
predicted future returns.  The results provide evidence that survivor bias does not impact the conclusion that 
subsequent abnormal returns support the original event study. 
 
These results should be of interest to a number of academics that use longitudinal studies to measure 
various events.  They provide insights into the importance of understanding the nature of non-survivors in 
longitudinal studies prior to assuming that survivor bias may be impacting the results in a particular direction.   
R 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – April 2012 Volume 10, Number 4 
252 © 2012 The Clute Institute 
PRIOR RESEARCH & RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Discussions of survivor bias are found extensively in the finance literature beginning as early as the 1980s 
where Blieberg (1986) argues that because poorly performing portfolios tend to be eliminated when their managers 
are replaced, the remaining universe available for study “is the universe of finishers.”  He goes on to say that “the 
best we can do is simply to be aware of the nature of the universe.”  Raftopoulos (1987), in a discussion of 
Blieberg’s paper, points out that “a cumulative historical comparison that seeks to include defunct portfolios would 
somehow have to make assumptions about what their performances would have been up to the present…” and goes 
on to offer alternative approaches using proxies based on portfolios without survivor bias.  Brown, Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson and Ross (1992) use economic modeling to show that truncation by survivorship gives rise to apparent 
persistence in performance.  This persistence can be strong enough to account for the strength of evidence favoring 
return predictability in mutual funds.  Malkiel (1995) estimates the effect of survivor bias on mutual funds, 
documenting significant differences between funds that survived from 1982 to 1991 and those that did not.  Kothari, 
Shanken and Sloan (1995) take issue with a study by Fama and French (1992) that finds two variables (ME and 
BE/ME) capture much of the cross-section of average stock returns, arguing that their results are influenced by 
survivor bias in the Compustat database that they use.  Using an alternative data source (Standard & Poor’s industry 
level data), Kothari et al. (1995) find that BE/ME is, “at best, weakly related to average stock return.  In a follow-up 
paper, Fama and French (1996) argue that survivor bias does not materially impact their results because it is less 
important in value-weighted portfolios and for large stocks used in their study.  Citing these discussions, Barbee, 
Mukherji and Raines (1996), in a study focused on two alternative measures (S/P and D/E), exclude data prior to 
1978 in order to “avoid the effects of survivor bias in the Compustat tapes.”  Loughran and Ritter (1996) argue that 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) introduce survivor bias in their study of low-priced stocks by requiring that all firms 
selected for their sample have complete returns for 36 months.  In a study of commodity trading advisors (CTAs), 
Schneeweis, Spurgin and McCarthy (1996) find that in the year before dissolution, the average non-surviving CTA 
had -27% annualized returns, which was consistent with earlier studies.  Because of these prior studies, subsequent 
studies often use sample data sets that are free of survivor bias (Carhart, 1997; Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2001), 
while other studies try to account for the survival effect when analyzing their results (Dussauge, Garrette and 
Mitchell, 2004; Shamsie, Phelps and Kuperman, 2004; Rich, 2006; Liu, 2008), some using an econometric 
technique developed by Heckman (1979) that estimates omitted variables. 
 
Most of these earlier studies focus on standard portfolios of mutual funds or other similar pre-assigned 
bundles of related data.  Little, if any, research focuses on firm specific survivor bias issues, other than to 
acknowledge survivor bias as a limitation.  This paper addresses that gap in the literature by following up on a prior 
event study (Hayes et al., 2001).  It measures the impact that survivor bias may or may not have on subsequent 
longitudinal studies that compare the original reaction by the market in the event study to the actual results 
experienced by the shareholders over time.    
 
Like other event studies, the Hayes et al. (2001) study measures the reaction of the market to the 
announcement by using cumulative abnormal returns over a two-day window surrounding the announcement date.   
According to the efficient market hypothesis, the market will incorporate the anticipated impact of the 
announcement into the share price within a narrow window of a few days (Ang and Zhang, 2004).  Therefore, if the 
market views the announcement as good news, positive abnormal returns would be expected.  Conversely, if the 
market views the announcement as bad news, negative abnormal returns would be expected.  Since Hayes et al. 
(2001) found significant positive abnormal returns, they conclude that shareholders view the investment in ERP as 
good news. 
 
Since this type of study only provides insight into the expectations of the shareholders at that point in time, 
it doesn’t answer the question as to whether or not the ERP system was, in fact, a good investment.  One way to 
answer that question is to follow up this type of study with an analysis of actual results over an extended period of 
time following the implementation.  Morris (2011) uses long-horizon buy-and-hold returns in such a study that 
includes firms from the original Hayes et al. (2001) sample, plus additional firms implementing ERP systems in 
subsequent years.  However, of the 91 firms from that original sample, 36 of them did not have required data 
available for the five-year period following implementation, so they were excluded from the study (i.e. non-
survivors).  Since the original event study concluded that investors in these firms reacted favorably to the 
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announcement that an ERP system was being implemented, natural follow-up questions could be stated as follows: 
 
RQ1: “Was the original reaction of the capital markets to these announcements predictive?” 
 
RQ2: “Does survivor bias impact the results of this follow-up analysis?”   
 
 In other words, if someone were to have invested in each of these firms on the date of the announcement 
and held onto that stock through some future date, would that have been a good investment as predicted by the 
market on the event date? 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To test these research questions, the study first uses long-horizon abnormal returns for the survivors to 
establish a baseline, which represents a typical follow-up study that excludes non-survivors.  If abnormal returns are 
significantly positive, then one could conclude that the initial reaction of the market to the announcement was 
predictive.  If the abnormal returns are significantly negative, then one could conclude that the initial reaction was 
not predictive.  The following model, adapted from Ang and Zhang (2004), is used to calculate abnormal returns: 
 
imimim tBmttAb ReReRe   (1) 
 
where AbRetim is the abnormal return for firm i in month m, Retim is the return for firm i in month m, and BmRetim is 
the return for a benchmark of firm i in month m.  Individual returns are monthly holding period returns from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database.  The CRSP value weighted index for the same month is 
used for benchmark returns.  Abnormal returns are calculated for all available months following the original 
announcement through December 2009. 
 
The study then examines non-survivors to determine why they did not survive.  If they filed for bankruptcy, 
then one could argue that the ERP investment probably does not provide a benefit to shareholders and exclusion 
from the sample creates a positive bias.  On the other hand, if they were acquired by another company at a premium 
price, one might conclude that the ERP investment has a positive impact on shareholder value and exclusion from 
the sample creates a negative bias.  Table 1 summarizes the status of firms from the original Hayes et al. (2001) 
sample as of December 2009.  Of the original 91 firms, only 50 (54.9%) have survived, assuming survival is defined 
as having data available in the CRSP database.  Of the non-survivors, 13 firms (14.3%) have merged with firms that 
are publically traded with data available in CRSP, eight firms (8.8%) have been acquired by other firms that are not 
publically traded, 12 firms (13.2%) have been delisted and either taken private or are now trading in over-the-
counter (OTC) markets, and six firms (6.6%) have filed for bankruptcy.  Data for two of the firms cannot be located 
at all, so their survival status is unknown. 
 
To measure the effect of survivor bias, assumptions have to be made with respect to the firms that did not 
survive.  It is reasonable to assume that shareholders who invested in the 13 firms that merged with other publically 
traded firms would probably have ended up with shares of stock in the new firm.  Therefore, for purposes of this 
study, the abnormal returns generated by the successor firm are used as a proxy for those months following the 
merger date.  For those that were acquired by firms that are not publically traded, a reasonable assumption would be 
that the original shareholders were probably cashed out and would have re-invested the proceeds into other shares of 
stock.  For this study, those investors are assumed to earn returns at the benchmark rate for months following the 
acquisition.  Most of the firms that have been delisted appear to have been struggling, and since delisting generally 
happens because firms no longer meet the minimum financial requirements of the exchange, it is assumed for this 
study that the original investment is lost at the point where delisting occurs.  A similar assumption is made with 
respect to those firms that file for bankruptcy, and for both groups, zero return is used as a proxy for months 
following either the delisting or the bankruptcy filing dates. 
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Table 1:  Summary of Sample Firm Status 
Firms with data in CRSP as of 12/31/2009 (survivors) 50 54.9% 
Firms merged with other firms in CRSP database 13 14.3% 
Firms acquired by firms not in CRSP database 8 8.8% 
Firms delisted from major exchanges and/or taken private 12 13.2% 
Firms that filed for bankruptcy or reorganization 6 6.6% 
Firms for which records cannot be found/verified 2 2.2% 
Total firms from original Hayes et al. (2001) study 91 100.0% 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the abnormal return statistics for the 89 firms for which data, or the proxy 
data discussed above, are available from the announcement date through December 2009.  The first column shows 
data for the 50 survivor firms, the next four columns provide data for the 39 non-survivor firms, and the last column 
summarizes data for all 89 firms.   
 
 
Table 2:  Summary of Abnormal Return Statistics 
 Survivors Merged Acquired Delisted Bankrupt All Firms 
Number of firms 50 13 8 12 6 89 
Average months 149.9 146.5 150.0 144.6 149.8 148.7 
Total firm months 7,496 1,904 1,200 1,735 899 13,234 
Mean monthly return 0.0056 0.0095 0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0107 0.0037 
Median monthly return -0.0006 -0.0048 0.0000 -0.0130 -0.0130 0.0000 
Standard Deviation 0.1207 0.1753 0.0728 0.2122 0.1263 0.1420 
Minimum  -0.7906 -0.6044 -0.3958 -0.6903 -0.6370 -0.7906 
Maximum  1.5910 2.9387 0.5815 4.9605 1.5016 4.9605 
Standard Error 0.0014 0.0040 0.0021 0.2122 0.0042 0.0012 
T-Statistic*  4.040 2.370 1.330 0.540 2.550 3.020 
P-Value* <0.001 0.018 0.185 0.589 0.011 0.003 
* Mean monthly return not equal to zero 2-tail 
 
 
The mean abnormal monthly return for the 50 survivor firms is 0.56%, which is statistically significant at 
the p<.001 level using a 2-tail t-test vs. the null hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero.  Based on these initial 
results, one could conclude that market reaction in the event study accurately predicted the future because investors 
who purchased shares of stock in firms implementing ERP systems at the time of these announcements and held on 
to them through December 31, 2009 would have experienced a 0.56% better average monthly return than if they had 
invested in the average of all the firms in the CRSP database.  Most follow-up studies would only include these 50 
survivor firms, which would then raise the issue of survivor bias.  Specifically, how much are the results being 
influenced by the fact that 39 firms are dropped from the sample?  Most studies would probably caution that lack of 
data for non-survivors may be providing a positive bias to these results. 
 
The results for the 13 firms that merged with other publically traded firms show a mean monthly abnormal 
return of 0.95% that is statistically significant at the p=0.018 level using a 2-tail t-test.  This provides evidence that 
the exclusion of these 13 non-survivors would not bias the results in the direction assumed above, since the average 
monthly returns are at least as high as those of the survivors.  The results for the eight firms acquired by non-
publically traded firms show a 0.28% average monthly abnormal return; however, the results are not significantly 
different from zero using a 2-tail t-test (p=0.185).  Therefore, the exclusion of these firms from the study would 
probably not have a significant impact either way on the overall conclusion.  Likewise, the results for the firms that 
have been delisted are not significantly different from zero, so their exclusion would probably not have a significant 
impact on the results, although they are negative at -0.28%.  The six firms that filed for bankruptcy show a negative 
average monthly return of -1.07% that is significant at the p=0.011 level using a 2-tail t-test.  Exclusion of these 
firms would bias the results in the direction assumed; however, since there were only six of them, it is doubtful that 
the impact would be significant in the overall results.   
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The final column confirms this by showing that for all 89 firms, abnormal average monthly returns would 
have been 0.37%, which is significantly different from zero using a 2-tail t-test at the p=0.003 level.  Although the 
average monthly abnormal return of 0.37% for the total sample is less than the 0.56% in the survivor sample, both 
would support the results of the original event study since both returns are significant at the p<0.01 level. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study examines survivor bias in a firm specific longitudinal case where 45% of firms used in an initial 
event study are no longer available for inclusion in a follow-up study.  A typical follow-up study would caution that 
“the results may be influenced by positive survivor bias,” assuming that only the successful firms survived.  
However, this study finds that some of the non-survivors did not survive because they were either acquired by, or 
merged with, another firm, indicating that they very well may be successful.  Using reasonable proxies to measure 
the contribution of the non-survivors shows that the initial follow-up results would not have been biased in this case.  
Although these results represent only one instance and are not generalizable to all follow-up studies, they do suggest 
that researchers should not just arbitrarily dismiss results as being influenced by survivor bias.  For longitudinal 
studies like this, it is important to investigate why certain firms do not survive and measure the results accordingly.  
This study also provides supporting evidence for the conclusions offered in the original event study. 
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